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In this next essay in a series of 'Perspectives on Geopolitics' - a number of provocative reflections from participants of MCC Brussels' landmark conference 'The Return of Geopoltics? Europe a year after Russia's invasion of Ukraine' - Dr Robert Castel examines how the war has crystallised a number of seminal changes in warfare and politics. You can read the rest of the essays in this series here.
2022: A revolution in Geopolitical affairs?
Let’s be honest: geopolitics is only a euphemism. We use the politically uncomfortable terms of geopolitics and geostrategy, in lieu of the even more unpalatable term Machtpolitik (power politics). Even the most perfunctory analysis will demonstrate that when we casually kick around the “G”-word, the references to the spatial dimension are completely lacking.
But let’s pretend for the sake of this argument that geopolitics, in its current usage, is really about the intersection of physical space and political power. With all the changes of the last twelve months both in physical space (the map of Ukraine), and political power (the lacklustre performance of both Russia and the questionable performance of NATO), it would be the height of naïveté to believe that geopolitics has stayed the same.
There is nothing ‘objective’ about the physical space we inhabit. Our perception of it is shaped by a very significant degree by the technology at our disposal (walking vs. flying) as well as by our cultural blinders (the dragons at the periphery of our medieval maps). Political power (especially its purest manifestation: warfighting) are shaped in a significant measure by the same variables: technology and culture.
Let’s take stock of some of the changes inaugurated by the Ukraine War:
- Offense vs. defence: At the tactical and operational level, the balance has shifted to favour defence. Fast moving offensive operations (such as operations in the first days of the war or the Ukrainian counter-offensive at Kharkiv) were the exception, rather than the norm. However, at the strategic level offense is still a powerful force, as witnessed by the relative success of the Russian missile-and-drone blitz.
- Quality vs. quantity: The West, turning its back on the experience of the Second World War, built its Cold War military strategy on quality, in contrast to the quantity focus of Warsaw Pact countries. This paradigm, while proven successful in the decades-long conflicts in the Middle East, lost much of its credibility in Ukraine. As of March 2023, the fate of the Ukraine War hinges not on some technological wizardry, but on the availability of millions of “dumb” artillery shells.
- Cheap vs. expensive: The Ukraine War may be dubbed as the Revolution of the Cheap. Iranian drones costing south of twenty thousand dollars are duelling with Western ground-based air defence missiles costing as much as the factory churning out those drones. Cheap Western antitank guided missiles blunted and stopped the Russian armoured thrust toward Kiev. Cheap Ukrainian Neptune missiles sunk the Moscow cruiser and cheap Russian naval missiles keep Ukraine under almost complete naval blockade.
- Simplicity vs. complexity: Our Western weapons have become ever more complex. Due to their high complexity and cost, these tools were impossible to procure in adequate numbers even to satisfy even peacetime demands. Moreover, this growing technological complexity resulted in ever longer training time both for the combatants and for the support personnel. These very characteristics made our baroque arsenal the worst possible tools for the outfitting of our less technologically sophisticated proxies. The (mis)adventures of the German wunder-howitzers in Ukraine is only one case in point.
- Mass armies vs. small elite forces: The late 20th and early 21st century concept of a state-of-the-art military was a small, agile and smart force built on a small cadre of specialists. The Ukraine War however, reintroduced the concept of mass armies of hundreds of thousands of troops participating in combat operations. These figures remain largely abstract until we consider that the siege of a smallish city in the Donbass swallows military contingents about the size of the entire British regular army.
- GDP vs. GDP: Another great discovery of the current conflict is the fact that not all GDPs are created equal. Suddenly, the nominal figures became very much irrelevant. The most important question is now: what is your GDP based on? Is it based on Netflix serials or steel mills? In other words, a great military power with no industrial base and no guaranteed access to raw materials is not a great military power.
Hiding behind these specific changes lies a larger question: Can war continue to serve as ‘the continuation of politics by other means?’ Compared to the Six Day War or the Dash to Baghdad, contemporary war has become a much less effective, let alone less efficient tool for the realization of political goals. Russia’s inability to subdue a much weaker Ukraine and NATO’s inability to subdue a much weaker Russia are two cases in point.
As we have seen, these are not exclusively Western afflictions and the pathologies of the Western way of war have infected Russia and, it is safe to assume, China too. Now, with all this said, we should ask ourselves the most important questions: How will the above-depicted changes in the character of war transform geopolitics – and what will the new post-unipolar international system look like?
Here I would like to offer a few observations:
First, we witness the gradual self-downgrading of the United States from hyperpower status to that of a mere superpower. We see also the economic and demographic decline of Russia, and the demographic freefall of China. Together with other systemic woes, this will create a condition of superpower paucity. We were brought up to fear friction among these tectonic plates, their decline creates a set of new problems. One of the early signs of this superpower paucity is the return of the old and venerable profession of piracy on the High Seas.
Second, this superpower paucity will lead to the emergence of a new category of middle powers as regional near-peer competitors to the retreating superpowers. The main lesson for these middle powers is that nuclear weapons are the great equalizer. As in any exclusive gentlemen’s club, the nuclear club’s only important piece of real estate is the threshold. If you are in, it doesn’t matter that much how many warheads you possess. If you are out, however, then you should consider the fate of Libya and Ukraine, two states that have stood on that very threshold and took a fateful step back.
Third, systems of alliances, patron-client relationships and other political constructs cobbled together in the old bipolar and unipolar orders will be increasingly irrelevant in the new transitional era. The byzantine international institutions, mere window dressings for the power structures of the unipolar moment, will be the first to go. National military power, while paying lip service to the increasingly ceremonial alliance systems, will soon turn into a threat in itself. Nominal allies will be feared at least as much as nominal enemies. Poland, I’m talking to you.
Fourth, while navel-gazing academics and out-of-touch media mandarins will continue to wax lyrical about global governance, soft power, and international norms, we are moving on a well-defined track from order to chaos. Eventually out of this chaos a new order will emerge. But until then, any talk about a rules-based international system will be pronounced as rubbish.
For those who find this prognosis disturbing, I can offer a few words of consolation. There is no point in blaming the collapse of the current world order on the Ukraine War, on Russia or Putin. We should not confuse symptoms with causes. During the last half millennia, we have seen the rise and fall of a long list of “world orders” from Westphalia to Bretton-Woods.
Once we successfully resist the narcistic temptation to consider our times and ourselves as unique and special milestones in history, we will be better equipped to take a philosophical look at the long and difficult road before us.
Paraphrasing Biden we may find consolation in the following thought: “C’mon man! At least we are cursed to live in interesting times.”
Dr. Robert Castel is the Chief Security Officer for the Israel Nature and Parks Authority
MCC Brussels aims to promote genuine dialogue and debate about the key issues facing Europe. We are committed to publishing a diverse range of voices. These articles represent only the views of their authors, and do not neccessarily represent the official position of MCC Brussels, MCC, its employees or partners.
You can read the rest of the essays in this series here.
